

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
Newport, R.I.

**“When Culture and Doctrine Collide: Military, Multi-Mission, Maritime Service?”**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

**Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_

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Some of the service’s rich traditions, however, represent a stark contrast to this new “war fighter” mentality. Managing this cultural-doctrinal gap is critical to the service, as it struggles to define and forge a constant and consistent role in the joint military operations environment. For a combatant commander, however, understanding these cultural distinctions can result in enhanced appreciation of unique and extensive Coast Guard mission capabilities and a more effective utilization of forces.

## **“When Culture and Doctrine Collide: Military, Multi-Mission, Maritime Service?”**

A quiet evolution is underway...the U.S. Coast Guard, always best known for its humanitarian and life-saving efforts, is now squarely focused on its military and national defense mission. The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent increased national interest in homeland security have accelerated this evolution, as typified by remarks in the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*. In fact, after 211 years of exemplary public service, the U.S. Coast Guard recently promulgated its first doctrinal directive, *Coast Guard Publication 1*, a superb portrayal of the organization’s rich heritage and historical evolution into a “military, multi-mission, maritime service.” This directive’s similarity to other Department of Defense joint military publications is clearly identifiable and apparently intentional, belying the service’s desire to increase its national security role.

Altering the service’s direction, however, will likely require more than the promulgation of a single doctrinal publication. Indeed, many of the service’s missions and rich traditions represent a stark contrast to this “warfighter” mentality. The U.S. Coast Guard may be facing a cultural-doctrinal dilemma, a phenomenon that occurs when a service’s organizational culture does not match up well with its current mission emphasis...and, as other military services have discovered, this phenomena may result in less than optimal mission performance. As the service struggles to define and forge a constant and consistent role in the joint military operations environment, managing this cultural-doctrinal gap is critical. More importantly, however, with a basic understanding and appreciation of this culture, a regional combatant commander can discern innovative and more effective utilization of Coast Guard assets, capitalizing on the inherent broad base of experience and extensive maritime mission capabilities.

## **The origins of a schizophrenic service...**

There will not be two services. There will not be a Life-Saving or a Revenue Cutter Service. It will be the Coast Guard.

Captain Ellsworth Price Bertholf, 1915

In the Tariff Act of 1790, the U.S. Congress authorized the formation of the Revenue Marine, as well as construction orders for ten “cutters.” The purpose of this fledgling organization was to repress smuggling and ensure the appropriate collection of duties and taxes on foreign goods and shipping...for years, representing the only armed vessels sanctioned by the new Republic. In 1797, the impending Quasi-War with France lent the Revenue Marine its first military mission, imbedding a martial tradition in the organization as it subsequently deployed under the control of a recently reconstructed U.S. Navy...a tradition that would be repeated several times throughout its history.

As the Navy grew in size and capability, Revenue Marine augmentation of national defense efforts began to assume a lower priority and the organization shifted its emphasis to the ever-increasing demands of maritime trade. The Service became involved in maintaining aids to navigation and law enforcement. In another logical progression, in 1837 Congress authorized the President “to cause any suitable number of public vessels...to cruise upon the coast, in the severe portion of the season...to afford such aid to distressed navigators as their circumstances and necessities may require.”<sup>1</sup> Indeed, this congressional mandate resulted in the organization’s most respected tradition of assistance to life and property on the sea. As the population and their reliance on maritime trade grew, Congress established a separate agency, the U.S. Life Saving Service (LSS). The LSS and the Revenue Marine often found themselves working closely together, with the Revenue Marine frequently providing logistics support and personnel to lifeboat stations along the coastal United States.

Ironically, the strategy that resulted in the formation of the U.S. Coast Guard actually began with an attempt to eliminate the Revenue Marine, or the Revenue Cutter Service as it had come to be known. In 1911, in an response to a presidential mandate to increase the efficiency of the federal government, the Cleveland Commission made a general recommendation to eliminate multi-functional government agencies, transferring their assets and responsibilities to other existing departments. The “multi-mission” Revenue Cutter Service was an ideal test case for the application of this theory. When asked to comment on the report, the Navy agreed that it could use the RCS cutters, but Secretary of the Navy George Meyer had reservations:

“It is true that the chief functions of the Revenue Cutter Service can be performed by the Navy, but this cannot be done as stated in the Cleveland report in the regular performance of their military duties. All duties which interfere with the training of personnel for war are irregular and in a degree detrimental to the efficiency of the fleet.”<sup>2</sup>

Apparently, the Navy did not relish the performance of military operations other than war, even in those early days. In complete agreement, Secretary of the Treasury Franklin MacVeagh responded:

“The Navy could never give the kind and degree of attention that is required of the Revenue Cutter Service and its officers and men trained in their particular duties for 120 years. The Revenue Cutter Service’s work is alien to the work of the Navy, alien to the spirit of the Navy, and alien, I think, to its professional capacities and instincts – alien certainly to its training and tastes.”<sup>3</sup>

Finally, in 1914, Congress supported a bill to combine the strictly civilian Life-Saving Service and the military Revenue Cutter Service. In combining these military and civilian services and their missions, Captain Ellsworth Price Bertholf, the first Commandant of the Coast Guard was faced with a delicate challenge. One could argue that this challenge is no less delicate today. The U.S. Coast Guard has never divested itself of any of these

missions...it continues to embrace the traditions of national defense, law enforcement, search and rescue, maritime regulation, as well as other missions.

### **Culture vs. Doctrine**

Obviously, every service has an organizational culture. As James Q. Wilson points out, “Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual. Like human culture generally, it is passed on from one generation to the next.”<sup>4</sup> Faced with overcoming past popular organizational metaphors like “the Lifesavers” and “Smokies of the Sea”; *CG Pub 1* does a credible job in capturing this service culture, collating the service’s tradition into a tidy package. The service, to its credit, has actually enjoyed considerable success in managing its mission “diversity.” Frankly, the multi-mission character of the Coast Guard may be one of the organization’s best and most endearing traits. However, this mission diversity contributes significantly to the impending dilemma and, as Don Snider states “...history abounds with examples of military cultures that rendered armed forces grossly ineffective at their assigned task.”<sup>5</sup> Or, as previously stated, a cultural-doctrinal gap merits consideration when it can have an adverse impact on operational performance.

For example, the U.S. Marine Corps has faced such a dilemma, only in reverse. The U.S. Marine “warrior” reputation is highly deserved and enormously respected...however; this expeditionary force has been, and will likely continue to be, frequently assigned missions overseas that require less than a heavy hand. From the end of the nineteenth century until 1934, the U.S. Marine Corps engaged primarily in the conduct of small wars, a term applied in those years to the pacification of less developed peoples by major powers.<sup>6</sup> In this period, Marines landed in the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Honduras, Mexico, Guam, Samoa, China, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In many cases, the necessary actions were constabulary in nature and the maintenance of cordial

relations with the native population was important to their eventual success. As a result, many believed the service must do more to establish clear-cut doctrine for these types of operations. In 1935, the Marine Corps first published a *Small Wars Manual*, the final revision of which appeared in 1940 as a comprehensive, 428 page definitive guide for constabulary and pacification operations.

The authors of the *Small Wars Manual* noted that the kind of military action they were writing about differed significantly from conventional war. The Marine's own psychology, or culture, would have to be different from that of regular wars and the manual went to great lengths to point out these psychological differences. The prescient nature of this work is profound in light of recent concerns over the efficacy of Marine and Army forces in a peacekeeping role. The directive's discussion regarding the conduct of troops in theater included excerpts like:

“In small wars, caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life...in small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass population.”<sup>7</sup>

This type of language is rarely seen in Marine Corps doctrinal guidance. It was so alien to their culture, in fact, that for all intents and purposes, the *Small Wars Manual* was largely forgotten in the aftermath of World War II. Indeed, when a Marine officer prepared a study of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics in 1960 for the training manual *Anti-Guerrilla Warfare*, he was unaware that the *Small Wars Manual* actually existed.<sup>8</sup> The resistance of the Marine culture to embrace this type of warfare unfortunately prevented its adaptation in preparation for the most significant small war in U.S. history. One naturally wonders what might have happened if the *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 had been carefully reviewed and adopted by American leaders in the early stages of involvement in Vietnam



and had tried to apply the lessons it contained.<sup>9</sup> One could also argue that in this case, both the Army and Marine Corps service cultures did not support this doctrinal guidance...or, in other words, service culture detracted from optimal mission performance.<sup>10</sup>

The Coast Guard's dilemma may not be as historically noteworthy, but it is none the less significant. In fact, the service's mission diversity may make it even more of a challenge. Carl Builder states "Military professionals are products of a highly specialized military culture, yet they are complexly different among themselves, for each is also a product of more specialized organizational cultures, honed by their service branches, and within their services by their specializations."<sup>11</sup> With specialties ranging from polar icebreaking to the civilian maritime regulation, one can imagine the diversity of cultures existing within the service.

Other factors have a significant impact. *CG Pub 1* accurately states "The nature of our service has evolved as we accumulated new roles and missions from a variety of sources...these additional roles and missions were assigned throughout the years for a very pragmatic reason – we were willing to perform the assigned missions and able to perform them effectively and efficiently."<sup>12</sup> In many cases, Coast Guard mission emphasis is a practical response to events...mass migration from Cuba and Haiti necessitated emphasis on migrant interdiction operations...the Exxon Valdez incident shifted the focus to marine safety, vessel inspection and environmental response...and national interest in the "War on Drugs" shifted the emphasis to counter-narcotics. As might be expected, the events of September 11 have significantly shifted the organization's emphasis to homeland security.

Both officer and enlisted attitudes are influenced by a variety of factors. In the absence of a significant event as described above, Commandant's have individual agendas and can significantly alter the service's mission emphasis...a phenomenon that retired Captain

Bruce Stubbs recently described as “whipsawing the service.”<sup>13</sup> Human nature being what it is, officers develop “favorite” missions based on past experiences and as a result, ships can frequently have mission personalities. For example, a major cutter commanding officer that has predominantly been assigned on the east coast is likely to be more familiar, and subsequently more comfortable, with Caribbean counter-narcotics operations. That CO may have a hard time adjusting to what is perceived to be a more pedestrian mission of fisheries enforcement, particularly if the deployment is in the harsh context of a winter Alaska patrol. In most cases, cutter crews are significantly more effective in one mission area over another, depending on their “mission personality.”

With all that said, the Coast Guard’s austere past fiscal environment has relegated the national defense mission to one of the least supported. Typically, significant joint participation with the Navy has been limited to one or two cutter deployments per year for each Area Commander. In the recent past, Pacific Area typically deployed one high endurance cutter per year to the Fifth fleet AOR for MIO operations and possibly participated in one or two other, less involved exercises. At this pace, a PACAREA high endurance cutter could expect to deploy in a true naval warfare capacity, on average, once in every 4 to 5 years...certainly not enough to maintain mission proficiency. On the east coast, the deployment frequency is similar, discounting Joint Interagency Task Force deployments, which are essentially independent Coast Guard operations.

Notwithstanding these inherent difficulties in meeting the requirements for national defense, particularly with limited resources, global trends in the threat environment are compelling the Coast Guard to prepare for greater emphasis on this mission. As early as 1999, Admiral James M. Loy, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, was advertising

the organization as “a unique instrument of national security.” Describing the 21<sup>st</sup> century environment, he aptly stated:

“America’s citizens and interests – and its allies and friends throughout the world – are at increasing risk from a variety of transnational threats that honor no frontier: extreme nationalism, terrorism, international organized crime, illegal alien migration, drug trafficking, conventional weapons smuggling, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental damage, complex flows of trade and state aggression...Further, the National Security Strategy makes clear that a “close coordination across all levels of government - federal, state, and local – will be fundamental to success. In this regard, the Coast Guard is an increasingly important and, indeed, unique asset in America’s multi-faceted security strategies at home and abroad.”<sup>14</sup>

Recent events, both international and domestic, have proven the validity of his predictions, and it now appears that the Coast Guard stands at the threshold of an organizational breakthrough. As the lead maritime agency for homeland security, the creation of a new combatant commander to lead this effort virtually guarantees the Coast Guard a more vital and consistent role in joint military operations...a topic that bears discussion later in this analysis. However, in the near term, notwithstanding the cultural baggage previously discussed, how can a regional combatant commander employ Coast Guard forces in a way that capitalizes on this “split personality?”

### **Theater Engagement Plans**

The plethora of peacetime missions performed by CG forces make them ideally suited to significantly augment a combatant commander’s Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) with regard to “shaping” activities. The National Military Strategy defines shaping as:

“U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggressions and coercion.”<sup>15</sup>

In this arena, combatant commanders will rarely need to concern themselves with “cultural commitment.” Coast Guard forces typically relish the opportunity to work with their international counterparts, and typically engagement focuses on the more widely accepted missions of search and rescue, maritime interdiction and law enforcement. As a Navy admiral recognized after a 1995 deployment to the Baltic, the Coast Guard is,

“...the right force to reach the majority of these navies, especially the Partnership for Peace navies. What these countries need and can afford is Coast Guard type missions and associated force structures. The Coast Guard is an excellent example of how to merge together an agency with military and civilian duties.”<sup>16</sup>

As possibly the premier example, the counter-narcotics efforts in U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility have forged a necessary and close relationship with Coast Guard forces. As a result, the availability of Coast Guard forces for participation in SOUTHCOM’s peacetime engagement plan has been significant. In 1999, General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, extolled the virtues of Coast Guard participation in a letter to Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Mortimer Downey. In the letter, General Wilhelm lauded the service’s mobile training teams, Caribbean Support Tender and Coast Guard participation in the theater exercise program, stating:

“The Coast Guard has earned and enjoys an unprecedented level of trust and credibility with the countries and organizations within the AOR. USCG forces and missions closely match those of the region’s navies, and through a multitude of engagement activities and initiatives, the Coast Guard is the ideal mentor and role model.”<sup>17</sup>

Unfortunately, however, SOUTHCOM is likely the only regional combatant commander that has functionally embraced Coast Guard forces as an integral part of the Theater Engagement Plan. Indeed, Coast Guard engagement and shaping efforts have occurred in other theaters. For example, Atlantic Area cutters have deployed to the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas in support of EUCOM initiatives, conducting port calls and working

with foreign navies and coast guard forces of various countries. However, while Coast Guard participation in PACOM initiatives have recently been in support of military operations and exercises, a cursory look at CINCPAC's theater engagement plan identifies only one exercise that has USCG forces as a regular participant...quite surprising, given the considerable opportunities for peacetime international cooperation, particularly in the living marine resources and law enforcement arena.

For example, while piracy has been virtually eliminated in most areas, Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia still suffer frequently from acts of piracy...these countries are likely quite interested in Coast Guard law enforcement doctrine and tactics. In addition, TEP participation is not limited to those Coast Guard units identified in the Joint Service's Capabilities Plan (JSCP). For example, buoy tenders based in the Pacific may, at times, operate in the Seventh Fleet AOR, and as such, may be available for significant engagement efforts. Polar icebreakers present other particularly intriguing opportunities for foreign engagement, as well. Notwithstanding the service's limited resources, more focus is required on regular participation in regional combatant commanders' Theater Engagement Plans...the opportunities here are tremendous, both from the shaping as well as the joint military operations perspective.

### **Military Operations Other Than War**

The MOOTW mission essentially spans the spectrum of conflict between the extremes of peacetime engagement and major theater war. The Coast Guard typically conducts operations at the lower end of this spectrum, which happens to be, coincidentally, the area which most of the other services regard as less than attractive with regard to operations, including humanitarian operations, enforcement of maritime sanctions, peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation operations and anti-terrorism/force protection. As such, this area is

of particular interest with regard to analysis of Coast Guard mission capabilities and culture.

Unfortunately, formal agreements with the Department of Defense are not terribly imaginative with regard to Coast Guard participation in this environment. The 1995 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation assigned four major national defense missions to the Coast Guard in support of U.S. regional combatant commanders. These missions include Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), Military Environmental Response Operations, Port Operations/Security and Defense (POSD) and Peacetime Engagement.<sup>18</sup>

The POSD mission has essentially become the defining Coast Guard national security mission. Significant and frequent deployments over the last two years, coupled with the visibility afforded by increased homeland security efforts in the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks has indelibly burned the port security capability into the minds of joint military planners. As evidenced by deployments to the Arabian Gulf in the wake of the USS Cole incident, the rapid mobilization demonstrated in the aftermath of 9/11, and the recent deployment to Guantanamo Bay, the CG port security units have become the *de facto* response to any crisis which entails harbor defense and port security concerns. In short, this force is not subject to the inherent Coast Guard cultural dilemma...these active duty and regular reserve units recruit outside the multi-mission envelope. Port Security units wear BDU's as their work uniform, train as a rapid response organization and have no question as to their mission...they simply await mobilization and deployment orders, operating much like Special Operations Forces. Regional combatant commanders are aware of their existence and as a result of recent operations, will likely not hesitate to request these specialized services.

Similarly, another group of “special forces” exist in the form of Coast Guard National Strike Teams, strategically located on the east, west and gulf coasts of the United States. These teams of highly trained hazardous material experts remain on call to respond to any environmental crisis. These forces represent the core capability for meeting the mission of military environmental response operations, the second mission identified in the 1995 Memorandum of Agreement. An example of the applicability of this mission is the response to Iraqi generated crude oil spills during Operations Desert Storm. Obviously, belligerent actions such as this have the potential to significantly affect military operations in theater. Furthermore, responding to significant marine pollution incidents in the post-hostilities phase of a campaign is critical to successful war termination and restoration of critical infrastructure.<sup>19</sup> This force is also capable significant response capability in the event of large scale hazardous material/WMD attacks in the homeland defense arena, a capability exercised in response to the anthrax attacks in October 2001. Again, due to the singularity and emergent nature of their mission focus, coupled with a significantly enhanced training and screening process, CG National Strike Team forces display little of the cultural difficulties previously discussed.

The final mission identified in the 1995 Memorandum of Agreement is Maritime Interception Operations. While the “bread and butter” of Coast Guard core capabilities, this tasking and its associated missions probably represent the largest challenge with regard to Coast Guard culture. This may come as a surprise, as interception and interdiction operations are nothing new to the Coast Guard...the Revenue Marine was founded, in fact, with this purpose in mind. Over the years, the Coast Guard has been involved with this mission, interdicting slave traders, rumrunners, drug smugglers, poachers and illegal migrants. The cultural dilemma results from recent operations, particularly operations in

the Arabian Gulf in support of U.N. sanctions against Iraq. To participate in this mission, Coast Guard cutters are deployed alongside, and under the operational control of, their USN counterparts.

Deployments in the Pacific theater represent a heavy lift for a Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter. In preparation for deployment, the cutter command, control and communications procedures are typically completely overhauled, adopting Navy communications measures and reporting doctrine which is considerably different from CG procedures. The cutters will typically be retrofitted with the latest Navy networking equipment, and personnel will receive “just in time” training in its operation. The personnel allowance onboard a cutter is not nearly as robust as a comparable USN platform, and as a result, considerable attention is given at the Headquarters and Area personnel management levels to ensure the ship sails with a full complement to address the additional deployment requirements.

The aging propulsion and auxiliary plants present other challenges...special attention and additional maintenance funding is made available to prepare the plant. The high speeds associated with deployment with a carrier battle group and the higher fuel consumption of the cutter’s gas turbine engines require innovative engine configurations, fuel management and frequent underway replenishment. Finally, a cutter engaged in a six month USN deployment can expect to be outside the Coast Guard mission envelope for up to 15 months...six months of workups, six months of deployment, and another 3 months for crew rest and re-focus on more traditional Coast Guard missions.

Once deployed, this shining point of white light, juxtaposed against a background of haze gray, the cultural differences suddenly become apparent. Faced with a very restrictive schedule of events (SOE), the cutter departs homeport and is suddenly introduced to the



world of night steaming. Incessant communications exercises, battle group maneuvers, gunnery exercises, and frequent underway replenishment take their toll early on...as previously discussed, the personnel allowance aboard a cutter is not nearly as robust as their naval counterparts. Port and starboard watches are typical in most control stations during Condition IV steaming. Reporting requirements can be equally as annoying...one of the predominant cultural differences here is that Coast Guard cutters nearly always steam independently. Finally, Navy MIO doctrine does not match up well with Coast Guard procedures, particularly with regard to non-compliant boardings.

In view of all this additional effort, it becomes obvious that if one is not culturally onboard with the assigned mission, optimal mission performance is doubtful. It becomes imperative, then, that the operational commander search out the cutter with the highest military readiness posture, or warfighter mentality, when choosing a platform to participate in support of naval warfare missions. Careful selection of the culturally appropriate platform will likely go a long way in establishing a reputation of Coast Guard joint military capability and mitigating less than optimum mission performance, typically manifesting as resistance to accommodate USN doctrinal requirements, multiple personnel problems, and a high number of debilitating engineering casualties. To do otherwise will have long lasting effects...possibly resulting in the limitation or even cancellation of future deployments for all the wrong reasons.

That said, the experience of sailing in company with Naval vessels is invaluable, particularly as part of a carrier battle group. A high endurance cutter is typically relegated to plane guard duties in this case...an assignment that is beneficial in several respects. First and foremost, given the limited number of platforms which now steam with a CVBG, if an HEC is not plane guard, quite possibly a cruiser is filling that role...certainly, from a

capability and economy of force perspective, an HEC as plane guard is much more efficient use of resources. Second, junior deck watch officers will learn, first hand, the fine art of station keeping and maneuvering in close proximity to an aircraft carrier...an experience which is hard to explain to those who have never done it. Third, plane guard duties mitigate the cultural problem...plane guard is inherently a rescue mission, and the HH-65 helicopter can be involved in the SAR pattern, as well.

There has been recent debate with regard to further reducing these deployments based on resource constraints. This is a mistake...the continued participation of this mission is of critical importance to the service. The Joint Navy/Coast Guard policy of the National Fleet presumes increased interoperability in building a force needed to “establish the numerical sufficiency required for effective global operations.”<sup>20</sup> As the more capable Coast Guard Deepwater assets come on line in just a few short years, the Navy will likely look to the Coast Guard for increased participation in naval operations. The infrequency of national defense deployments already limits the experience base, and to not continue this mission risks depriving an entire generation of deck watch officers and operation’s specialists of this experience, serving to exacerbate the cultural dilemma.

### **Homeland Security**

The newly emphasized mission of homeland security has brought about an even more interesting cultural diversion, as well as a unique organizational dynamic. As previously stated, the homeland security mission will require significant participation and cooperation with the new homeland regional combatant commander, presumably resulting in a significant number of Coast Guard personnel assigned to the new combatant commander staff. Interestingly, this mission has resulted in the Coast Guard developing an inward focus...what some have termed a “port centric” approach. The responsibility for port

management has traditionally been assigned to the Marine Safety segment of the service. These officers have typically served in a regulatory and administrative role, working nearly exclusively with the civilian maritime community, and as such, are arguably the most “civilianized” segment of the service.

Ironically, these marine safety professionals now find themselves in control of homeland security operations, a mission for which this segment of the service was not prepared. For example, as cutters stationed themselves outside port entrances to board inbound high interest commercial vessels in the wake of September 11, they quickly realized that, in some cases, their would-be controllers at the Marine Safety Office/Captain of the Port (COTP) did not have the requisite infrastructure to control cutter operations...indeed, they did not even speak the same operational language. In any case, the service will likely encounter several more significant organizational and cultural challenges as the marine safety community moves toward the “tip of the spear” in the homeland security effort.

Albeit a significant challenge for the organization, aggressive pursuit of the homeland security mission offers an opportunity to accelerate consistent participation in the joint military operations environment. With the advent of U.S. Northern Command, the Coast Guard will likely form a significant staff element in this new combatant commander’s organization. The increased visibility and familiarity will be advantageous, and further establishment of relationships and support agreements within this complex interagency environment can only serve to bolster awareness and confidence in the capabilities of this service...hopefully resulting in more formalized and fully-resourced joint military operations mission requirements.

## Summary

In conclusion, *Coast Guard Publication 1* does a superb job at defining the essence and origins of the Coast Guard's multi-mission culture. With its promulgation, however, the service has tacitly admitted unease with regard to its cultural identity in relation to its organizational vision. While the idea of a doctrinal publication has reputedly been debated for over ten years, the timing of its issuance is extremely appropriate. In a recent piece in *Proceedings*, Admiral Loy explains,

“These principles constitute the Coast Guard’s doctrine. They are our common approach to thinking about operations, not a set of strict, prescriptive rules. With training and experience, however, this shared outlook leads to consistent behavior, mutual confidence, and more effective collective action, without constraining individual initiative. Doctrine also contributes to clarity of thought in times of crisis or emergency, and our actions in the wake of the 11 September attacks have been guided by the principles discussed in Publication One.”<sup>21</sup>

The aftermath of 11 September is compelling the Coast Guard to emphasize its martial traditions...the national security mission will, as expected, assume greater emphasis as a result of recent events. The service’s mission “diversity” appears to be here to stay, as well. In the near term, the new moniker of “military, multi-mission, maritime service” represents an organizational challenge of huge proportion...yet it is necessary. The service needs, more than ever, to incorporate into the joint military operations organization, as it will take a combined and cooperative effort on the part of all of the military services to successfully address the new threat environment and ensure our continued national security.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Act of December 22, 1837 (5 Stat. L. 208).
- <sup>2</sup> Robert Erwin Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 – Present*, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1987), 20.
- <sup>3</sup> Irving H. King, *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865 – 1915*, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996), 232.
- <sup>4</sup> Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, Military Professionalism and Policy Making, *Soldiers and Civilians*, edited by Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 407.
- <sup>5</sup> Don H. Snider, An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture, *Orbis*, Winter 1999, 11-26.
- <sup>6</sup> Ronald Schaffer, The 1940 Small Wars Manual and Lessons of History, *Military Affairs*, April 1972, 46.
- <sup>7</sup> Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940 (Washington, D.C., 1940), 1-16
- <sup>8</sup> Ronald Schaffer, pp. 46-51.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid, pg. 50.
- <sup>10</sup> It must be noted that the Marine Corps units in Vietnam under General Walt had a great deal of success employing more traditional methods of counter-insurgency...methods which used the tenets espoused in the Small Wars Manual. The Combined Action Platoon concept was employed very effectively, and these combined units were very useful in controlling the VC insurgency, leading Marine Corps leadership to recommend adoption of this strategy throughout the theater. Unfortunately, General Westmoreland's insistence on capitalizing on firepower and mobility with his search and destroy tactics never let the Marine strategy fully materialize. In the end, General Walt admitted that the leadership had been overly optimistic and "failed to appreciate the importance of the guerrilla", adding that the Marines eventually discovered that they had to win the people over in order to succeed.
- <sup>11</sup> Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 9.
- <sup>12</sup> U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, CG Publication 1(Washington, D.C., 2002), 55.
- <sup>13</sup> Bruce Stubbs, We are Lifesavers, Guardians and Warriors, *Proceedings*, April 2002, 53.
- <sup>14</sup> James M. Loy, A Unique Instrument of U.S. National Security, *Sea Power*, December 1999, 8-13.
- <sup>15</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, 1997.
- <sup>16</sup> James M. Loy, Shaping America's Joint Maritime Forces, Coast Guard in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1998, 9-13
- <sup>17</sup> Bruce Stubbs & Scott Truver, *America's Coast Guard*, U.S. Coast Guard (Washington, D.C. 1999), 79.
- <sup>18</sup> Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation on the use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy, 3 October 1995. Annex A defines Maritime Interception Operations conducted to enforce the seaward portion of certain sanctions against another nation or group of nations. Annex B defines Military Environmental Response Operations as those responding to incidents of marine pollution that have the potential to adversely

affect U.S. and allied/coalition defense operations. Annex C defines Port Operations, Security and Defense as operations conducted to ensure port and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats, terrorist actions and safety deficiencies that would be a threat to support and resupply operations. Annex D defines Peacetime Military engagement as all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.

<sup>19</sup> Stubbs & Truver, *America's Coast Guard*, 76

<sup>20</sup> National Fleet, A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement, 21 September 1998 states that the Navy and Coast Guard commit to shared purpose and common effort focused on tailored operational integration of our multi-mission platforms, meeting the entire spectrum of America's twenty first century maritime needs. While we will remain separate services, each with a proud heritage, we recognize the need to work more effectively together. We describe the process for closer cooperation as the "National Fleet," a concept that synchronizes planning, training and procurement to provide the highest level of maritime capabilities for the nation's investment. The National Fleet has two main attributes. First, the fleet is comprised of surface combatants and major cutters that are affordable, adaptable, interoperable, and with complementary capabilities. Second, whenever appropriate, the fleet is designed around common equipment and systems, and includes coordinated operational planning, training, and logistics. In particular, the Coast Guard's contribution will be maritime security cutters, designed for peacetime and crisis response Coast Guard missions, and filling the requirement for relatively small, general purpose, shallow draft warships. All ships and aircraft of the National Fleet will be interoperable to provide force depth for peacetime missions, crisis response, and MTW tasks.

<sup>21</sup> James M. Loy, Coast Guard Pub One is Our Doctrine, *Proceedings*, May 2002, 192.

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